

## **THE INTERPRETATION OF THE *DASEIN* IN MOZAMBIQUE'S POLITICS OF FOREIGN AID**

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### **Abstract**

*Dasein's being-in-the-world is characterized by Dasein's involvement and determination of its own project. Taking a nation as Dasein, each nation in the spirit of democracy and sovereignty ought to determine her project for the common good of her citizens. However, some powerful nations in the modern world are fond of micromanaging 'small' nations especially those from Africa. This is nothing other than alienation. Mozambique is one of such 'small' nations that have been remote controlled by the 'powerful' nations hence making it hard for her to relish the fruits of being-in-the-world. Mozambicans bear the responsibility of gradually constructing their own development while addressing their daily necessities responsibly. In this context, foreign aid becomes meaningful for the advancement of Mozambican society only when it aids the state in establishing a structure that empowers individuals to exercise their autonomy in the pursuit of social, political, and economic emancipation.*

**Keywords:** *Dasein, freedom, authenticity, facticity, being-in-the-world*

### **Introduction**

This article presents an interpretation by *Dasein* in Mozambique's governance in terms of politics of foreign aid. The paper will do this by clarifying some basic concepts of the philosophy of *Dasein*. In the complicated nature of Mozambique's political landscape, the existential dimensions of the human experience, as expounded by the philosopher Martin Heidegger, come to bear on the nation's approach to foreign aid. This paper delves into the existentiality of the human reality within the Mozambican context, unraveling the threads of authentic facticity, being-with-others, and the temporal triad of past, present, and future. Through an existential analysis of death, the paper explores the profound assertion that death is not merely an endpoint but a distinctive way of being, shaping the essence of Mozambique's engagement with foreign aid.

Within the realm of Heideggerian philosophy, man is portrayed as a being towards death, and this perspective unfolds against the backdrop of Mozambique's socio-political milieu. The awareness of death, as something transcendental, permeates the national consciousness, influencing how Mozambique grapples with foreign aid and its implications for development. While Heidegger's concept of anxiety captures certain aspects of this existential awareness, the paper critically

examines its inadequacy in encapsulating the complexities inherent in Mozambique's political response to foreign aid.

Furthermore, the paper scrutinizes the contextual dimensions of democracy in Mozambique, considering how the existential understanding of being-in-the-world and being-with-others intersects with the democratic aspirations of the nation. As the paper navigates through the past, present, and future of Mozambique, it unravels the authentic fallenness, being-in-the-world, and being-in-one-self, shedding light on the nuances that shape the nation's political identity.

Central to this exploration is the place of foreign aid in Mozambique's development trajectory. Foreign aid is not merely a financial transaction; it is a manifestation of the *Dasein*, influencing the essence of Mozambique's political existence. As this paper deciphers the existential implications of foreign aid, it uncovers how Mozambique grapples with authenticity, temporality, and its existential stance in the global arena.

In essence, this paper seeks to interpret the *Dasein* in Mozambique's politics of foreign aid, bridging the philosophical insights of Heidegger with the concrete realities of a nation navigating its path towards development and self-discovery.

### 1.1 Authentic Existentiality, Being-in-One-Self and Future

Heidegger discards previous notions of the self and thinks of the human being as a *Dasein*, a *being-in-the-world* that exists inseparably from its relations to others and its shared projects. To capture the phenomenon of being with others in the world Heidegger coins the term *Mit-Dasein*, a being-there-with other *Daseins*. However, his emphasis on the existential-ontological category of *Mit-Dasein* is too often criticized for failing to account for a genuine inter-relational model of the self in *Being and Time*. Michael Theunissen, for example, argues that Heidegger has a purely formal account of *Mit-Dasein*, as *Dasein* is in the world and, as such, in the world with others.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, the signal trait of authenticity that first materializes in Heidegger's discussion of *being-toward-death* in *Angst* is *Dasein's* freedom from others, the everyday opinions of the *They* or the herd. It is, therefore, not surprising that the standard interpretation of authenticity is along the lines of a subjectivism that has served to divide Heidegger's thinking into two parts: An earlier Heidegger that is still caught in the cycle of subjectivist thinking and a later Heidegger who has displaced the subject as the origin of truth.

Heidegger exhorts authentic *Dasein* to choose, to relate, to endure and to be ready for *Angst*.<sup>2</sup> "The most extreme not-yet has the character of something *to which Dasein relates*"<sup>3</sup> Indeed, to have a conscience is to accept *Angst*.<sup>4</sup> The paper proposes that the way that *Dasein* relates to the nothing, to its being-toward-death, is by holding the nothing open as the horizon of its possibilities. Holding

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<sup>1</sup> Michael Theunissen, [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-19558-8\\_35](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-19558-8_35) (Accessed on 29<sup>th</sup> June, 2023).

<sup>2</sup> Connotes anxiety.

<sup>3</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 250/231.

<sup>4</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 296/272.

open the nothing is akin to what the later Heidegger refers to *letting be*. As a horizon, the nothing does not limit possibilities but is itself limited by virtue of the possibilities that it circumscribes. This horizon is what characterizes temporality. Temporality, therefore, grounds the groundless nothing. *Ecstatic temporality clears the there primordially*.<sup>5</sup> Yet, it is only through *Dasein's* relations with others and lived possibilities that the nothing may be made into something, the ground of all of *Dasein's* possibilities.

Indeed, authentic *Dasein* is not only attuned to other present *Daseins* but to *Daseins* that have been there before and will be there in the future. These others belong to its *Mit-dasein*. In *Dasein's* ability to respond to others that have been there, *Dasein* attains its authenticity through a loyalty to the world that has been there. *Retrieve is explicit handing down*, that is, going back to the possibilities of the *Dasein* that has been there.<sup>6</sup> To retrieve possibilities is not to relate to things dead and past. Rather retrieve *responds* to the possibility of existence that has-been-there.<sup>7</sup> It responds to the world belonging to others before. Thus, to take up one's historicity authentically means to be in a dialogue with those who have been there before by way of responding to the world from which these others understood their possibilities, a world whose influence is there in the remnants and ways of being that have been left behind.

Nevertheless, this is possible only in a co-attunement- in the community of those who find themselves mutually attuned to the same horizon of possibilities. This is one among the three inseparable characteristics of human being. The term is a derivative of "Existence" and is one of the most constitutive structures of *Dasein*. It is used exclusively as particular to man; for only man characterized by this kind of relation. By existence, man distinguishes himself from the other items or objects in the world and is open to himself and open to the world. Hence, the term Existence (*existenz*) refers to the type of Being which is particular to *Dasein*. The Being (*Sein*) itself to which *Dasein* can relate itself in some way Heidegger calls existence.

Existentiality, however, is characteristically a being of possibility (*Emoglichung*). As regards this, therefore, Greece opines that, "Man is possibility, he has the power to be. His existence is in his choice of the possibilities which are open to him and since this choice is never final, once and for all, his existence is underdeterminate but not terminated."<sup>8</sup> In such underdetermined existence *Dasein* discloses in itself the existential structure of projection. In projection *Dasein* sees itself as "in" and "of" and "with" the world. It moves toward, beyond and ahead of itself. It also moves toward itself since such movement constitutes its very essence. *Dasein* constantly direct itself upon future and moves outside itself, from what is to what is not yet. As regards to this, Onwuatuegwu notes that, "Projecting sees the world as existing for *Dasein's* sake. It gives man the future characteristic of moving towards his possibilities, of actually becoming. Hence, it is understanding

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<sup>5</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 351/321.

<sup>6</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 385/352.

<sup>7</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 386/352-353.

<sup>8</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 386/352-353.

and projecting that *Dasein* can call itself back to the self.”<sup>9</sup> This notion of possibility can take "authentic" or "inauthentic" form depending on the *Dasein's* mode of existence.

### **1.1.1 Existentiality of the Human Reality**

Clearly, this is the most fundamental dynamic trait of human reality. Yes, *Dasein* (man) is enveloped by the facticity of his existence which constitutes a brute fact of his history and prevailing concrete situation. Again, in his fallenness, man is preoccupied with inauthentic existence very often manifested in the distractions of everyday life. However, in spite of these ontological challenges, Heidegger vehemently states by his conception of *Dasein*, that man has intrinsic and inherent capability to overthrow the conditions of his facticity and fallenness. By existentiality, Heidegger maintains that it represents man's "possibility" and "necessity" to become whatever he may want to be. It could also be seen as the inherent capacity in man to be what he is not and to transform his limitations (facticity) to actualities or possibilities within a spatio-temporal reality.

Existentiality more so, confers on man, the power to continuously transcend his immediate state or situation by way of proffering solutions and answers to challenges. Existentiality as such is a dynamic concept and full of praxis in human situation. It constantly serves as a reminder that the human mind has the potency for creativity of any kind in spite of its temporality dictated by time and space. Indeed, as an ontological attribute of *Dasein*, existentiality remains the strongest asset and resource. It could be likened to man's armoury and power house in which he relies on for self-defense to continue to exist in a bid to continue to give life a meaning, self-fulfillment and actualization. Existentiality, unlike facticity and fallenness which express man's finitude. It is concerned with the future of man and his goals which are attainable through the possibilities inherent in him. Unah, writing on Heidegger's philosophy, maintains that Heidegger regards human existence as an inexhaustible reservoir of meanings.

### **1.2 Authentic Facticity, Being-with-others and Past**

Authenticity implies realizing one's position in his everyday being with others in the world. And this self-realization is characterized by the fact that each individual is uniquely himself, and that each has his own potential possibility to fulfil. Macquarie, hence, maintains that, Existence is authentic to the extent that the existent has taken possession of himself and has moulded himself in his own image.<sup>10</sup> Even at that Heidegger still insists that, Authentic Being - one's-self does not rest upon an exceptional condition that has been detached from the they; it has rather an existential modification of the they... as an essential *existentiale*<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> N. I. Onwuatuegwu, Explicating Martin Heidegger's "*Dasein*" as being-in-the-world. *International Journal of Health Sciences*, Vol. 6, No. 5(2022):5218–5227. <https://doi.org/10.53730/ijhs.v6n5.9766> (Accessed on 29<sup>th</sup> June, 2023) and Akam, J. B. (1989) "Unpublished Lecture on Metaphysics", Bigard Memorial Seminary, Ikot-Ekpene.

<sup>10</sup> Jacque Macquarie, *Heidegger Martin* (London: Luther Worth Press, 1986), 26.

<sup>11</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 42.

As such, authenticity in Heidegger does not overlook the fact that "Dasein" relates with its "co-Daseins" and other existents. Rather it is calling for constant disclosedness for living authentically to the extent that *Dasein* relates itself to things around it. With this *Dasein* becomes conscious of the fact that it is being-with-others, thus, possessing an exclusive ontological relation with them. Such disclosedness, however, should not be construed in terms of contiguity, causality or coincidence, but as a special irreducible kind of relation. Thus, one lives authentically when one accepts one's existential possibility and lives it to the full. When a person grasps this; his/her concern with the world instead of being a mere concern to do as people in general do, to do things necessarily for living as other members of our society live, one can now have an authentic concern, to fulfill one's real potentiality in the world.<sup>12</sup> In authenticity, therefore, one grasps one's own uniqueness, the concept of inwardness and subjectivity.

From the foregoing discussion, it has been established that *Dasein* has been cast (*geworfen*) into the world without being consulted. It is faced with some challenging burdens which placed limitations over its being or existence. According to Macquarie, facticity denotes all those elements in human existence that are simply given not chosen.<sup>13</sup> In other words, facticity has a significance of thrownness. It comprises those pre-determined *givens* of man such as his sex, nationality, cultural background, *et cetera*. Amidst these limitations "*Dasein*" has no option other than appropriate and assimilate freely within the inescapable limits. Consequently, man is left with the task of transcending his situation and in attempt to do so facticity imposes some limitations and places an ontological limitation to "*Dasein's*" projection and factually binds his possibility.

Therefore, Heidegger, facticity is what decides, conditions, and determines *Dasein's* existence from out of and through *Dasein's* own existence in the world. That is, the existential determining of *Dasein's* existence in the world, of *Dasein's* ways of being in the world. In other words, facticity is that whose origin is the existence of *Dasein* in the world, that which determines and conditions *Dasein's* existence and that which, in its determining and conditioning, renders available genuine choosing and authentic possibilities. Importantly, in early Heidegger's thought and whilst working on his dissertation and habilitation, facticity is placed over against the logical in neo-Kantianism, which is universal, absolute and timeless. That is, facticity is related to what is accidental, individual and temporal.

During Heidegger's early lectures in Freiburg, he phenomenologically philosophizes life in its direct revealing and giving of itself. According to Heidegger, the situation, in which one finds oneself, and the world, which surrounds and decides one's life, are experienced and understood by human life. Facticity is here perceived as a life encountering itself in a meaningful world through its own familiar situation. According to Heidegger, factual life in its facticity, its richness of relations and meanings, is what is nearest to us. Heidegger then begins to take *Dasein's* factual

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<sup>12</sup> Mary Warnock, *Existentialism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 44.

<sup>13</sup> Macquarie, *Heidegger Martin*, 33.

life in the world as the ground in which he grounds his notion of facticity. That is, the inevitable togetherness of *Dasein* and its world is that in which Heidegger's facticity is grounded, since, for Heidegger, *Dasein* is always immersed in its world. This notion of *Dasein*'s constant immersion in its world is introduced and discussed in *Being and Time* and also in the Marburg lectures of 1924 to 1928. According to both the Marburg lectures and *Being and Time*, *Dasein*'s being is a being-in-the-world in the sense that being-in-the-world is what decides and forms *Dasein*'s being.<sup>14</sup>

*Dasein* is constantly in a world; *Dasein* lives in a world. Manifold relations thus result from this being-in-the-world; manifold ways in which *Dasein* relates to different objects and an already implied and encountered Other. These relations and manifold ways of relating are governed by "care", for they, in their totality, constitute *Dasein*'s world.<sup>15</sup> Only *Dasein* can be in a world; only *Dasein* can live in a world. Objects and animals, for Heidegger, cannot be in a world. Objects and animals, according to Heidegger, are world-less; they merely occur within the world, they do not live, they are not, in a world. *Dasein*, on the other hand, lives and is in a world, a world that is formed and constituted by *Dasein* itself. Hence, *Dasein*'s thrownness belongs to *Dasein*'s facticity, for thrownness indicates that *Dasein* finds itself already thrown into a world, a situation, and that which determines and conditions *Dasein*'s own existing in the world.<sup>16</sup>

Facticity, thus, refers to *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world; it says *Dasein*'s own and unique ways of existing in the world existentially and ontologically. In other words, facticity refers to *Dasein*'s existing in the world from out of and through this existing itself. This means that facticity is not a descriptive, theoretical, detached, or scientific analysis of *Dasein*, but rather *Dasein*'s own existential being in its world, that is, *Dasein*'s ways of existing in a world shared by others. According to Heidegger, to facticity belongs "the being-in-the-world of an 'inner-worldly' being but in such a way that this being can understand itself as bound up in its 'destiny' with the being of beings that it encounters within its own world".<sup>17</sup>

Moreover, facticity also refers to how *Dasein*'s existence in a world which determines, decides, and governs *Dasein*'s possibilities, that is, how *Dasein*'s own being-in-the-world conditions the possibilities offering themselves to *Dasein* and how what is offered as a possibility is that through which could *Dasein* become what it is not or remain what it is. This is why Heidegger says that *Dasein* is constantly more than it factually is and that to the facticity of *Dasein* belongs the possibility of being "what it becomes or alternatively, does not become. In other words, *Dasein*'s ways of existing in the world are determining, deciding, and governing. Yet from out of what

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<sup>14</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 27.

<sup>15</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 29.

<sup>16</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 19.

<sup>17</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 27.

determines and renders conditioned and decided, authentic possibilities and genuine choosing arise and first become possible.

Facticity to Heidegger and generally under the existentialists' philosophy is a reality that man is not consulted to make a choice whether to be given birth to or not, whether to be male or female, black or white, tall or short, Idoma or Tiv, intelligent or indolent, Muslim or Christian, Palestinian or Jew, among others. Man is simply 'thrown into existence in the world among people and things. Earlier, it has been noted that man is a fountain of possibilities however; these potentials are limited by man's facticity. For instance, man's future projections are finite as they are limited by the facticity of death. Other limitations include ill health and inevitable natural disasters which are unforeseen or even when foreseen man stands helpless before them. To live a life that is authentic, Heidegger advises that since man is limited by the conditions of human existence which are the already givens, man is better off when he accepts that existence is always factual. That is, man has to accept the fact that he has no choice but to live with certain situations as they are instead of being overwhelmed with anxiety on how to change them.<sup>18</sup>

However, man is not to allow his existence to be overtaken by the *factual givens*. Man must consciously embark on measures to subdue human facticity and dominate them for his own good. For instance, the facticity of the brevity of human life does not prevent one from making future projections or transcending his immediate environment to come out with breath-taking inventions for the advancement of humanity. Anyone with such potentials who refuses to employ them to better the lot of mankind is regarded by his action as an act of "bad faith".<sup>19</sup> Man in spite of his finitude cannot refuse to create meanings and values which constitute the sum total of history. The history of man's past is very important because his present and later undertakings depend on it.

### **1.3 Authentic Fallenness, Being-in-the-world and Present**

*Dasein* in the world is not alone but with his *co-Daseins* and other entities. He is influenced by them in his every day activity. However, he tries to accomplish his human vocation and thus authenticate his existence amidst his inescapable relation with them. In such a situation the "*Dasein*" has the tendency to occupy itself unduly with the others. It stands a chance of losing itself in a crowd - an unthinking collectivity. Hence, Heidegger defines Fallenness as, an absorption in Being-with-one-another.<sup>20</sup> Mmadudiri & Onwuatuegwu note that, "Fallenness constitutes the ontological quest for knowing one's Being, realizing one's being, which essentially belongs to *Dasein* as being-in-the-world."<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 27.

<sup>19</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 30.

<sup>20</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* trans. J. Macquarrie, & E. Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1962), 28.

<sup>21</sup> Ignatius Nnaemeka Onwuatuegwu and Evaristus Chimaobi Mmadudiri, "A Philosophical Investigation of Neo-Paganism in the Present Igbo Society in the Light of Martin Heidegger's Fallenness," *International Journal of Management, Social Sciences, Peace and Conflict Studies (IJMSSPCS)*, Vol.3, No.3 (September, 2020):33 – 47.

However, the "absorption in" has the character of Being-lost in the "publicness" of the "they". Here, the forward driving and the unique individual existence is substituted by the persistent and pressing "they". *Dasein* gets lost in the "idle talk" of the "they", thereby lowering itself to the level of *Das man*, the anonymous individual and have itself snatched from it. If this is not properly checked, "*Dasein*" is bound to be characterized by inauthenticity. With this Heidegger proposed two basic modes of human existence, namely: "authenticity" and "inauthenticity."<sup>22</sup> The proceeding exposition of basic structures of "*Dasein*" has been made to assist in proper comprehension of these basic modes of existence and their attainability. The paper now moves into explicating what Heidegger really means by authentic and inauthentic existence.<sup>23</sup>

Fallenness intertwined with the facticity of human existence is the fallenness of humanity. Man has the tendency in him to be overwhelmed by the phenomenon of death, and other natural occurrences and even individual limitations such as his size, the hue or the skin colour, height and sex, among others. Having enveloped himself in these and many other givens, these factual givens very often dominate the consciousness of man thereby causing his disillusionment. Thus, man becomes fallen when he freely surrenders to the facticity of human existence. By such giving-up, man gets carried away to the extent that he accepts his 'factual givens', as an excuse for his prevailing situation. This disposition makes man to consider himself a foreclosed entity, a closed chapter without anything else to contribute to human history. Being so attuned to the daily distractions, man becomes largely influenced by them and subconsciously, undermines his potentials to advance to a superior mode of being.<sup>24</sup>

The point Heidegger is making is that it is futile to begin to get so engrossed in anxiety over things or situations one cannot change or improve. If, for instance, one covets the office of the Vice Chancellor of his or her institution without attaining the professorial cadre and more so, as the serving Vice Chancellor is yet to complete his term of five years, is an indication that someone is living in a world of fantasy. This is precisely what Heidegger refers to as inauthenticity of man. This mind-set of desiring to be what may not be possible in a particular situation at a particular time is expressed in man's fallenness. It is of significance for man to live above inauthenticity to live a genuine life. For there to be an authentic form of governance in Mozambique, the politics of foreign aid ought to be reviewed using the Heideggerian perspective of a liberal State. It is by such a life style that he attains the superior mode of existence. Where distractions and fantasies rule an individual's life, like those arising from the negative aspects of foreign aid, such citizens live perpetually an inauthentic existence or life in a society whose autonomy is highly influenced by the donors.

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<sup>22</sup> Gerhard Thonhauser & Hans Schmid, *From Conventionalism to Social Authenticity: Heidegger's Anyone and Contemporary Social Theory* (London: Oxford Press, 2017), 41.

<sup>23</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 34.

<sup>24</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 26.



#### 1.4 Existential Analysis of Death in Heidegger

Heidegger reflected on the mystery of death in his works, *Existence and Being*, and *Being and Time*. Whenever he mentions death, he does not mean how one thinks at the time one is dying, for someone at the point of death may not be making a reflection. Again, he does not imply one's feeling at the time of death, rather, what one understands the coming of death to be when drawing close towards death. Sequel to this, Heidegger defined death as "the innermost and irrelative potentiality of being, certain and indefinite as to its "when" and not to be over-come."<sup>25</sup> Affirming that death is a mystery beyond human comprehension, Heidegger refutes the claim that man's experience starts with his birth, and ends in his death. His intention is to posit how the being-in-the-world (*Dasein*), who is the being-towards-death can comprehend his own death in an authentic way, as well as his attitude and behaviour towards his death. For him, this cannot be solved by observing the death of others, but by grasping the proper nature of the not-yet element involved in *Dasein*'s existence.<sup>26</sup>

According to Heidegger, the imminent nature (closeness) of death renders man's happiness and anxiety to be short-lived. Thus, death is a potentiality of being that is to be taken by *Dasein* himself. Death's potentiality cannot be escaped by *Dasein*, for the existence of the latter pre-supposes that his is already thrown into this potentiality. For this, Heidegger admits that so long as man is a being-in-the-world (*Dasein*), he is a being moving towards death. Explaining this he says:

Being-towards-death is a potentiality-for being of that entity whose kind of being is anticipation itself. In the anticipatory revealing of this potentiality-for-being, *Dasein* discloses itself to itself as regards its utter possibility ... death is *Dasein*'s own-most potentiality-for-being in which its very being is the issue.<sup>27</sup>

##### 1.4.1 Death is a Way to be, Not a Way to End

In the mind of Heidegger, death is not only that which one experiences at the departure of life, while life itself is not just a clear road that invites the occurrence of death. Death penetrates as if it constitutes the existence of time for in the moment, *Dasein* is thrown into the world. Using the analogy of an unripe fruit to explain death as a way of life, he posits:

When for instance a fruit is unripe, it goes towards its ripeness. In this process of ripening, that which the fruit is not yet, is by no means pieced on as if something not yet present at hand. The fruit brings itself to ripeness, and such a bringing of itself is a characteristic of its being as a fruit.<sup>28</sup>

The above analogy of Heidegger indicates that insofar as man is a being in existence, certain element of achievement is in place. For just as unripeness is the first state of a fruit, so also is life

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<sup>25</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Existence and Being* (USA: Henry Regnery Company, 1965), 60.

<sup>26</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 27.

<sup>27</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 307.

<sup>28</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 287.

the first state of the *Dasein*, while as ripeness can be predicated of a fruit, similarly, death can be predicated of man. And why? This is because as the fruit tends towards being ripe, so also is the *Dasein* a being towards death. Thus, as long as he exists, death is already its not-as-yet (that is, something yet to be realized in the life of *Dasein* or man).<sup>29</sup>

It could also be said that Heidegger's analogy implies that the natural phenomena of ripeness and death are not something external to fruit and man respectively, but something that are part of them. The ripeness of a fruit is not accident, for it is in its nature to be ripe. The death of the *Dasein* is not by accident, neither is it an accident; it is that which is innate in man. Once a man is alive, he is a being towards death. In fact, what proves that man ever existed in history is the fact that he died.<sup>30</sup>

#### 1.4.2 Man, a Being towards Death

One clear point in Heidegger's reflection on death is that the *Dasein's* knowledge of the shortness of his existence is an advantage on his side. Consequently, he would be compelled to pursue his endeavours in a meticulous way. Therefore, the thought of death is a "stimulant" which enables man to be focused on how best to live his life, and necessitate a peaceful co-existence with others. Heidegger, hereafter asserts that authentic existence is the *Dasein's* being towards a potentiality, which he described as "a running forward in thought" to be potentiality, that is, that man is always aware of his death such that this awareness uncovers itself in and for its being as potentiality. Hence, anticipation of one's death turns out to be the possibility of understanding one's own ultimate potentiality-for-being, in other words, the possibility of authentic existence. Explaining more, Heidegger claimed that:

Being towards this possibility enables *Dasein* to understand that giving itself possibility of its existence... When by anticipation, one becomes free for one's own death, and one is liberated from one's lostness in those possibilities which may accidentally thrust themselves upon him. So, death has meaning for man's existence.<sup>31</sup>

In the same place, Heidegger argued that in *Dasein's* composition, something is not yet achieved, which is death. Death is not just the ending of man's life, or some unpleasant incident that befalls man, rather a vitalizing structural component of the human nature. Therefore, man is a being-unto-death; he begins to die the very day he is born, which is tantamount to saying that man is born to die.<sup>32</sup> The end of *Dasein*, thus, does not mean to stop, to get finished or to disappear, for none of these suitably characterizes death's nature as the end of *Dasein* insofar as *Dasein* is already not-yet for its not-yet constantly as long as it is, is already its end too.<sup>33</sup> The ending in Heidegger's

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<sup>29</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 27.

<sup>30</sup> Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, 63.

<sup>31</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 308.

<sup>32</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 400.

<sup>33</sup> A famous story told about Athanasius of Alexandria and Anthony of the desert (also of Egypt) reads that the former once asked the latter: "If Christ is to visit you now to join Him in Paradise, what will be your action?" Anthony

thought when reflecting on death is not that *Dasein* is a being-at-an-end (in German *Zu-Ende Sein*), but a being-towards-the-end (*Sein-Zum-Ende*). Death is a way which *Dasein* follows, for as soon as man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die.<sup>34</sup>

The statement, *death is a way of life* which is intrinsically situated in Heidegger's reflection indicates that the coming of death is neither a possibility, nor under probability, but rather, a reality. With reference to the analogy of the ripeness of fruit, death could be perceived, following Heidegger, as a ripeness of the existence of the factually thrown *Dasein*; as the fruit tends towards ripeness, so also can death be called the 'ripening' of the life of man.

The climax of Heidegger's teaching is that man goes towards his grave daily. Therefore, once a child is born, he is old enough to die. Even though death is individualistic, it does not follow that everyone must be old before dying, for the first characteristic of death which people pointed out is that of its universality which has no compromise. Even if this is *a priori*, people arrive at it *a posteriori*.

Heidegger only argued from one dimension which is atheistic. Death has many faces which people are yet to discover after they have experienced it. Thus, the Christians will vehemently reject his view that man comes by facticity (thrown into the world), by using the creation story to say that man is not an accidental being. Therefore, man's death is not an accident. In Heidegger's thought, people perceive death as a reality, that is, a possibility showing that man is a being towards death. Death as that which is individualistic, unavoidable, universal, imminence, inexorable and fearful. The concept has been traced within the Heideggerian image of man, which affects the concept of death. Instead of merely being an existential, death becomes an element in man's relation to being, so that a being-towards-death signifies not only the affirmation of the structure proper to *Dasein*, but also the deepest possible 'yes' to being itself.

### 1.4.3 Awareness of Death: Something Transcendental

It is death which distinguishes the authentic from the inauthentic *Dasein*. The inauthentic view of death is that it is a distant possibility, whereas the authentic *Dasein* is constantly aware of this possibility in anxiety. Heidegger maintains that *Dasein's* awareness of being-towards-death saturates and haunts *Dasein's* whole life. *Dasein* progresses towards death by undergoing projects, but *Dasein* cannot go beyond its own death. As Inwood notes, "A life without the prospect of death would be a life of perpetual postponement."<sup>35</sup> However such projects, which are steps towards new

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responded that he will continue with what he was doing. This shows that Anthony was always conscious of the mystery of death, and its arrival any moment. The application of the preceding story to Heidegger's reflection reveals that man is ever conscious of this mystery of death. Thus, he sees it as a neighbour not far away, granted of the reason that his expiration is a certainty. This is tantamount to positing that so long as man is man "thrown factually into the world," to live there with others, in the midst of the world, the same man will be "drawn" from that same world where he is thrown into. This logic is arrived at with the use of common sense. So, man anticipates the time when he will be "drawn up" from where he is thrown. This anticipation is influenced by his witnessing to the death of others.

<sup>34</sup> [https://www.northampton.edu/Documents/Subsites/HaroldWeiss/Death/Phil of death.pdf](https://www.northampton.edu/Documents/Subsites/HaroldWeiss/Death/Phil%20of%20death.pdf) (Accessed on 27<sup>th</sup> June, 2023).

<sup>35</sup> M. Inwood, *Heidegger; A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 1997), p. 69.

possibilities are radically different to death in that death is the ultimate limit which is beyond all others.

Death puts an end to all *Dasein's* possibilities. This impossibility is that which would complete *Dasein's* existential analysis. The realisation that *Dasein* must die on its own inaugurates *Dasein* with a *freedom towards death*.<sup>36</sup> Levinas rejects this account of anxiety, "Even in anxiety, even though anxiety, death remains unthought. To have experienced anxiety does not allow one to think it."<sup>37</sup> This is because people cannot know the nothingness of death, for Levinas claims nothingness is impossible to think of, as it is outside the phenomenal world; "In the being of beings, death is not understood."<sup>38</sup> Levinas proceeds to ask, "Is not anxiety over Being horror of Being just as primal as anxiety over death?"<sup>39</sup> This horror of being is that which Levinas discusses in *Existence and Existents*: it is the there is.

According to Heidegger, no one can die for anyone else. It is certain that *Dasein* will die, after all, "To have to be is to have to die."<sup>40</sup> Although it is not known this will happen, Levinas describes this Heideggerian certitude as "an a priori of death"<sup>41</sup> an "ever-open possibility... which cannot be averted but whose hour remains unknown."<sup>42</sup> *Dasein's* awareness of its own finitude is precisely what permits *Dasein* to embark upon projects. Death brings *Dasein* to this indefinite certainty, and as Øvernet notes, "Without a whole, an absolute concretum, these structural moments do not have an ontological status."<sup>43</sup>

### 1.5 The Inadequacy of Heideggerian Anxiety to Capture It

According to Levinas, The "three is" is the impossibility of nothingness:<sup>44</sup>

...the *three* is has such a complete hold on us that we cannot take nothingness and death lightly, and we tremble before them. The fear of nothingness is but the measure

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<sup>36</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper Perennial, 2008), 311.

<sup>37</sup> Emmanuel Levinas, *God, Death, and Time*, trans. Bettina Bergo (New York: Stanford University Press, 2000), 70.

<sup>38</sup> Death is not nothingness for Levinas, but is the impossibility of nothingness. As Derrida puts it, "It is the murderer who would like to identify death with nothingness" (Derrida, J (1997) *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas*, translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas, Stanford University Press, 1999), 6. Another interesting comment Derrida makes is that death is the single most important theme of Levinas's work; "And yet all of Levinas's thought, from the beginning to the end, was a meditation on death. (Cited in SMITH, M B (2005) *Toward the Outside. Concepts and Themes in Emmanuel Levinas*, Duquesne University Press, 2005), 178.

<sup>39</sup> Emmanuel Levinas, *Existence and Existents*, trans. by Alphonso Lingis (Berlin: Duquesne University Press, 2001), 5.

<sup>40</sup> The Jewish thinker Buber, who influenced Levinas greatly, and was also a critic of Heidegger ponders this question. He asks, "We know nothing about death, nothing but the one fact that we shall die. But what does it mean, to die?"

<sup>41</sup> Levinas, *God, Death, and Time*, 10.

<sup>42</sup> Levinas, *God, Death, and Time*, 254.

<sup>43</sup> E. Øvernet, *Seeing the Self: Heidegger on Subjectivity* (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), 254.

<sup>44</sup> Cohesive overview of the there is can be found in Keenan, D. K. (1999) *Death and Responsibility; The "Work" of Levinas*, State University of New York Press, 1999, particularly in Chapter 4, *On the Genealogy of Death*, in which he argues that Levinas's idea of responsibility is closely dependent on his account of death.

of our involvement in Being. Existence of itself harbours something tragic which is not only there before of its finitude. Something that death cannot resolve.<sup>45</sup>

Heideggerian anxiety cannot capture the “there is”; people cannot escape it even by dying. “The pure nothingness revealed by anxiety in Heidegger’s analysis does not constitute the “there is”.”<sup>46</sup> The “there is” asserts the impossibility of dying. It shatters our structure of mineness.<sup>47</sup> Reality is posited... in its exotic nakedness as a worldless reality, arising from a shattered world.<sup>48</sup> People are no longer masters of being.<sup>49</sup> The there is “leads us to the absence of God, the absence of any being”<sup>50</sup> it is indeed the absence of anything which may enable people to escape the burden of being.

This contrasts with Heidegger’s phenomenological inquiry into the phenomenon of death, in which *Dasein* is necessarily being-with-others (*Mitsein*). Being-with-others does not break *Dasein*’s structure of mineness. However, this structure signifies the impossibility of grasping the Other as Other, for if the Other is encountered at all, it is encountered so through the maintenance of the priority of the same within the imminence of Being. The encounter with the Other is not necessary to understand Being-with-others,<sup>51</sup> as Heidegger’s ontological preoccupation is with modes of Being rather than empirical encounters. *Mitsein* can therefore be considered as *Dasein*’s relation with Being rather than beings with one and the Other.

### 1.6 Context of Democracy in Mozambique

Democracy, like so many other important terms in politics, is a word of Greek origin, which combines two shorter words *demos* and *Kratos*, which can have more than one meaning: *Demos*, can mean a group of citizens living within a given agglomeration or city-state, or it can also be used to designate the population or the rabble, or the lower strata of a given society. The population or the rabble, or the lower classes of a given society.<sup>52</sup> *Kratos* can mean power or government,

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<sup>45</sup> Levinas, *Existence and Existents*, 5. Anckaert aligns and contrasts the three is of Levinas with Rosenzweig’s notion of the Nothing. He writes, “The there is a limit-concept, a dark reality wherein subjectivity and objectivity become lost... Man only has ways of access to the three is through such things as the experience of war, exotic art... Levinas radicalizes Rosenzweig’s Nothing.” (Anckaert, L A (2006) A Critique of Infinity; Rosenzweig and Levinas, Peeters, 2006, p. 30) Rolland also discusses Levinas’s there is, and explores the transition from Heidegger’s “Being” to “There Is”. (Rolland, J Getting Out of Being by a New Path, in Levinas, E (1982) On Escape; De l’évasion, translated by Bettina Bergo, Stanford University Press, 2003), 7.

<sup>46</sup> Levinas, *Existence and Existents*, 58. In *Violence and Metaphysics*, Derrida also considers the three is. He writes, „This solitude of the “existent” in its “existence” would be primordial and could not be conceived on the basis of the neutral unity of existence which Levinas often and profoundly describes under the heading of the “there is”. But is not the “there is” the totality of indeterminate, neutral, anonymous beings rather than Being itself?” (J. Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, trans. by Alan Bass New York: Routledge, 2009), 111.

<sup>47</sup> Levinas also finds an allusion to the three is in Blanchot’s *Thomas l’Obscure*, claiming that the opening of this work depicts „The presence of absence... the horror of being... the reality of irreality...” (Levinas, E (1978) *Existence and Existents*, translated by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2001), 58.

<sup>48</sup> Levinas, *Existence and Existents*, 49.

<sup>49</sup> Levinas, *Existence and Existents*, 55.

<sup>50</sup> Levinas, *Existence and Existents*, 56.

<sup>51</sup> C. Davis, *An Introduction to Politics* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1996), 29.

<sup>52</sup> Davis, *An Introduction to Politics*, 17.

which are not the same thing, in that it is perfectly possible to conceive of groups or individuals living within a given settlement or city-state, it is perfectly possible to conceive of groups or individuals who have power without actually governing in the official, visible sense.

The concept of democracy can refer to an ideal or a principle, thus falling within the realm of ideologies, or to various types of political regimes. In addition to the examples of the democratic personality and democratic methods in the field of psychology and organizational psychology and organizational theory that have been discussed at length, many other examples could be given, but we will focus our attention simply on the democratic ideal and democratic political regimes.<sup>53</sup>

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However, in addition to the definitional difficulties raised by the different uses of the term, there are other, more decisive difficulties that arise from its uses of the term, there are other, more decisive difficulties arising from its very content. Indeed, the crucial problem facing almost all definitions is that of choice (or even: dilemma). The core values of the concept are equality and freedom. What makes the democratic ideal so powerful on the one hand, and almost useless on the other, is the original ambiguity of the concept which results from the contradiction of the two principles (of equality and freedom) that underlie it. Democracy may in this context be an eminently paradoxical notion insofar as thinkers of liberal and Marxist-orientated thinkers are not mistaken when, on different paths and for different purposes, they and with opposite aims, point out that in matters of equality and freedom, the requirement of one and freedom, the demand for one usually tends to limit the exercise of the other;<sup>55</sup> but it is still our defense that liberty and equality constitute the principal "rules of gold of democracy"<sup>56</sup>. Thus, it is important to consider the following commonly used definition strategies:

- i. List the characteristics considered to be the minimum for classifying a given regime as democratic
- ii. Organize the content (descriptive or normative) of the concept around an idea - which may be participation, competition, or the degree of concentration of power, for example, to accept a plurality of definitions by reactivating them or even rehearsing a synthesis between the different ideological conceptions involved. Let us look at some examples of these different types of definitions:

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<sup>53</sup> Davis, *An Introduction to Politics*, 27.

<sup>54</sup> Davis, *An Introduction to Politics*, 67.

<sup>55</sup> Davis, *An Introduction to Politics*, 67.

<sup>56</sup> Davis, *An Introduction to Politics*, 70-71.

a) Ranney and Kendall seek an operational definition by the following minimum requirements for the classification of a democratic regime: popular sovereignty, political equality, popular consultation, and majority rule.

The authors point out that “all four of these elements must be present and that each of them, considered in itself, only assumes a democratic meaning if the presence of the other three is presupposed”. According to Juan Linz, a regime is democratic when it allows the free formulation of political preferences through the exercise of basic freedoms of association, information, and communication in order to establish free competition among leaders so that they can regularly monitor the peaceful means of their right to govern. The interest of this definition lies in the essential points of democratic theory (political freedoms, competition, and representation), while maintaining political freedoms, competition, and representation), while maintaining a balance between them, and not abandoning the purposes of an operational classification.<sup>57</sup>

b) Among the notions that are considered fundamental to the concept of democracy, are the notions of representation, competition, and the degree of concentration (or dispersion) of power. There is a classic position between the so-called mandate theory and the competition theory. The former has an eminently prescriptive character; its followers define democracy as a system of concentration (or dispersion) of power. Democracy is a system of representation. In the wake of the well-established theories of popular sovereignty, democracy is defined as the power of the people. Given the impossibility of its simultaneous exercise by all citizens (except in the cases of direct democracy or self-government), sovereignty has to resort to forms of representation.

Despite the inflow of foreign aid, the persistent underdevelopment in Mozambican society remains a source of concern. Contrary to conventional expectations, the continuous increase in foreign aid has not translated into improved living conditions for the majority of Mozambicans. Instead, poverty persists, and there is a growing dependence on foreign assistance. This heightened reliance has led to troubling levels of subservience on the part of the government towards donors. Such a scenario diminishes the political agency of the Mozambican people and undermines their dignity, excluding them from a process that directly affects them. The way foreign aid is processed, it cannot develop the country. Underlying this premise is a consideration of the factors that could enable Mozambican development. Within this framework, the assertion is that Mozambicans bear the responsibility of gradually constructing their own development while addressing their daily necessities responsibly. In this context, foreign aid becomes meaningful for the advancement of Mozambican society only when it aids the state in establishing a structure that empowers individuals to exercise their autonomy in the pursuit of social, political, and economic emancipation.

Macamo raises the issue in a short article, published in the CODESRIA Bulletin, entitled “Against Development”. In it, the author recalls the perspective defended by Popper, according to which

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<sup>57</sup> Davis, *An Introduction to Politics*, 70-71.

social changes are always the result of social engineering carried out little by little by individuals in dealing with their daily problems. In this sense, foreign aid accompanied by the great structural laws advanced by donors, often in pursuit of their own interests, cannot lead to development if they are not challenged by citizens, the target groups. This questioning would make it possible to ask whether the ways in which aid is processed create a system of opportunities in which individuals can autonomously provide for their own needs.<sup>58</sup>

Adejumobi Said argues that the concept of democracy needs to be indigenized so that it can address issues pertinent to the concerned society.<sup>59</sup> Bearing in mind of the communal nature of being, the very substance of Ubuntu is shared and this echoes Paul Gerner's concept of being-with as he reiterates Heidegger.<sup>60</sup> Leonard Tumaini stresses on this by stating that 'Ubuntu appreciates difference and diversity as richness. Diversity allows for a variety of contributions to the community by each member for each member for each member. Consequently, human society flourishes on diversity'.<sup>61</sup> So Dasein's being-in-the-world involves being with others and this calls for the Mbitian concept of coexistence 'I am because you are' which is the very heart of Ubuntuism.<sup>62</sup>

As such, this paper is of the opinion that the absence of a space for questioning makes the success of the development process unfeasible insofar as it excludes the contribution of those who must actually fight for their social well-being, both individually and collectively. Unfortunately, this is what happens when donors discuss the modalities of foreign aid with the executive, neglecting the broader debate and consequent monitoring by the individuals concerned. In turn, given its dependent and "subservient" nature, the government does the same when it reports preferentially to the donors, to the exclusion of society, which actually suffers the consequences of such behavior. There are honest, non-subservient cadres within the government, seriously interested in the wellbeing of their country and the needs to counteract this nefarious trend. Issues of national interest should not be discussed exclusively at the highest level between the government and the international community. It is extremely important for the good of society that the participation of Mozambicans, ordinary citizens, and Mozambicans, ordinary citizens. Given that foreign aid is fundamentally at the service of the interests of donors, Killick argued that the government has negotiating power and that dependence on aid need not result in subservience. In fact, the opposition to land privatization shows that the government can go against the wishes of donors, involve citizens in the discussion of the issues that affect them, and decide what is best for Mozambicans for the country to carry on as normal.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Davis, *An Introduction to Politics*, 5-7.

<sup>59</sup> Adejumobi Said. "Africa and the Challenges of Democracy and Good Governance in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century", Addis Ababa report (2000): 2.

<sup>60</sup> Paul Gerner. *Heidegger's Being and Time an Introduction*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007), 5.

<sup>61</sup> Leonard Tumaini C. *African Indigenous Ethics in Global Bioethics: Interpreting Ubuntu*, (New York: Springer, 2014), 51.

<sup>62</sup> John Mbiti. *African Religions and Philosophy*, (New York: Anchor Books Doubleday & Company 19170), 141.

<sup>63</sup> T. Killick, *et al.*, *Perfect Partners? The Performance of Programme Aid Partners in Mozambique, 2004. A Report to the Programme Aid Partners and Government of Mozambique* (Maputo: Alpha Book Publishers, 2005), 253.



Castel-Branco, states that there is no decision about Mozambique that belongs to the domain of the government that is taken by foreign agencies. The decisions are taken by the Mozambican government even the decisions that allow foreign agencies to decide in place of the Mozambican government. From this point of view, the paper argues that as a condition of possibility for the well-being of the country, the government needs to make decisions in favor of the autonomy of the individual. For example, decentralization constitutes an important reversal in terms of creating a context where people can make development choices and work towards it. By defining the district as a center of development and by allocating money to promote local income-generating activities at the local level, the current government is beginning to contribute to the responsibility of providing for their own needs. However, more needs to be done for the autonomy of the individual.<sup>64</sup>

The autonomy of the individual involves the principle of emancipation in its broadest sense. Political, social, and economic emancipation. As Macamo observed, the principle of the autonomy of the individual refers, in the specific case of Mozambique, to an aspect that has been central in the history of the Mozambican State, the constitution of a civic space for the manifestation of emancipation.<sup>65</sup> For the author, nationalism, rather than the desire to found a nation, as has often been argued, can be explained by the desire for individual autonomy denied by the colonial power. This desire for individual autonomy finds a convenient form of articulation in the ideology of nationalism. One only has to look at the social structure of Mozambican nationalism to see that it is essentially individuals who are frustrated by the colonial system and rise up against it. He adds that after ten years of a glorious struggle for self-determination, the same people who undertook it because they felt asphyxiated by the colonial system erected a State that did almost the same thing. Like the colonial state, the post-independence state was full of good intentions. It wanted to make people happier according to its own criteria itself. The formation of the *New Man* required the submission of individual will to the collective will. The Frelimo government created opportunities for men, women, and children, widened access to education and health, and lifted barriers to labor. Nevertheless, all this is according to the criteria that met the needs of the nation. These needs were defined by the nomenclature according to the supreme objective of building a socialist nation.

Today, multi-party politics has opened up a space for political competition and participation, but the dynamics of the decision-making, control, and verification system generally revolve around the government and the international community. Our democracy is still deficient because, in addition to the serious problem of underdevelopment, which makes it expensive, it does not promote popular political participation. A lot of things are decided by the executive without and sometimes even without consulting parliament. Macamo (2006) cites the example of the approval of *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PARPA)* between the Mozambican government and the donors without consulting parliament. In addition, the question arises: What if the Assembly of

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<sup>64</sup> Castel-Branco, *Aid Dependency and Development*, 631.

<sup>65</sup> E. Macamo, *Political Governance in Mozambique*. DFID (Maputo: Alpha Book Publishers, 2006), 234.

the Republic rejected the PARPA<sup>66</sup> or if civil society organizations mobilized a popular protest against IMF-inspired policies, and pressurized the government to resist donor advice? In fact, everything seems to indicate that the underlying assumption of the whole process is that Mozambique is not democratic. So, Mozambique needs to democratize herself, she needs to open up more public spaces for debating ideas about her future, and she needs to bet on the autonomy of the individual, the Mozambican citizen.<sup>67</sup>

Generally, this paper wants to emphasize the belief that individual autonomy is a good starting point for the social construction of our development and it presupposes that the state guarantees the space for its affirmation. In other words, the state doesn't need to seek, either individually or with its partners, material means to fulfill the daily needs of Mozambicans. What the state needs to do for the good of Mozambican society is to create a framework of rules and opportunities in which every Mozambican can be held responsible in providing for their individual well-being without harming their fellow human beings. Throughout the country's history, Mozambicans have already proved that they are capable of great feats. It's time to start believing that foreign aid will only have a positive impact if it is directed towards creating an environment where every Mozambican citizen can, in the process of working to meet their day-to-day needs, gradually contribute to national development.

### **1.6.1 Place of Foreign Aid in Mozambique's Development**

In its general sense, development is a process that presupposes the change of societies from a social, economic, political, and cultural situation in which individuals are unable to provide for their own needs to a stage where they are able to do so.<sup>68</sup> Among these needs which can be infinite, food, health, education, housing, employment, freedom, and justice can be highlighted. Generally, when people talk about development, their imagination turns to the social, economic, political and cultural situation in Western countries. Indeed, they have institutionalized the concept of development in their own way and have managed to impose it on other societies, which uncritically internalize it and draw up their own visions of development based on the organizational patterns of those countries. But does development necessarily have to be along the lines of Western societies?

From a Western hegemonic perspective, poor countries need to be developed in their own style, which is why it is justified to donate resources for this purpose. Foreign aid involving financial, material, human and prescription resources is drained to countries in need. However, the curious thing about this aid is that the priorities for Mozambican development are set in Washington and European capitals by people who have never been to Mozambique and who are more concerned with what looks good to their parliaments and financiers.

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<sup>66</sup> PARPA is the central objective of the Government and is a substantial reduction in the levels of absolute poverty in Mozambique through the adoption of measures to improve the capacities of, and the opportunities available

<sup>67</sup> Macamo, E. *Political Governance in Mozambique*. DFID, (Maputo, 2006), 235.

<sup>68</sup> Davis, *An Introduction to Politics*, 39.

## **Conclusion**

In the culmination of this exploration into the interpretation of the *Dasein* in Mozambique's politics of foreign aid, the philosophical underpinnings of Martin Heidegger intersect with the complex realities of a nation striving for authenticity in its political existence. The journey through authentic existentiality, being-in-one-self, and the future reveals a nation grappling with the temporal dimensions of its identity. As Mozambique navigates the existentiality of the human reality, the interplay of authentic facticity, being-with-others, and the weight of the past echoes through the corridors of its political consciousness.

The examination of authentic fallenness, being-in-the-world, and the present unravels the intricate tapestry of Mozambique's political landscape, shedding light on the nuances that shape its contemporary reality. Heidegger's existential analysis of death provides a unique lens through which we understand that death, far from being an end, is a distinctive way of being a truth that resonates within Mozambique's approach to foreign aid as a crucial aspect of its development trajectory.

In positioning man as a being towards death, we discern the profound awareness of death as something transcendental within the Mozambican ethos. This existential awareness becomes a guiding force, influencing the nation's choices, priorities, and engagements with the global community. While Heideggerian anxiety offers insights into the existential condition, its inadequacy to fully capture the intricacies of Mozambique's political response to foreign aid prompts a critical examination of the limitations of philosophical constructs in the face of concrete socio-political challenges.

Within the context of democracy in Mozambique, the interplay of being-in-the-world and being-with-others informs the nation's democratic aspirations. The place of foreign aid emerges not merely as a financial transaction but as a manifestation of the *Dasein*, shaping Mozambique's political identity and influencing its journey toward self-discovery and development.

It is evident that the interpretation of the *Dasein* in Mozambique's politics of foreign aid transcends philosophical abstraction. It is a living reality, a dynamic interplay between existential concepts and the unfolding narrative of a nation. In weaving together Heideggerian insights with the tangible experiences of Mozambique, this paper invites a deeper understanding of the existential currents that shape the nation's political landscape, offering a foundation for continued exploration and analysis in the ever-evolving tapestry of Mozambique's political journey.

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